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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EX POST FACTO CLAUSE-
DEPORTATION OF ALIENS 
In 1938, petitioner, an alien, was convicted of violating the 
iVIarihuana Tax Act.1 In 1952, Congress authorized the deporta-
tion of all such violators,2 including those convicted before pas-
sage of the 1952 act.3 Petitioner was ordered deported by an of-
ficer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and brought 
a writ of habeas corpus to review the Board of Immigration Ap-
peal's affirmation of the deportation order, claiming a violation 
of the ex post facto clause of the Federal Constitution.4 The 
district court and the court of appeals denied review, and the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed." The Court, declining to 
consider petitioner's contention in detail, merely cited two prior 
decisions, and refused to change the position there stated.6 
An early decision, Calder v. Bull, held that the ex post facto 
clause applied only to penal legislation.7 This decision has been 
severely criticized,8 but it is still followed.9 Such interpretation 
was contrary to that of contemporary state supreme courts,10 
and to previous statements made by two members of the Court.11 
The reports of the Constitutional Convention tend to indicate that 
ex post facto meant simply retrospective.12 The Court, in Calder 
150 Stat. 553 (1937), 26 U.S.C. § 2591 (1940). 
2 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1952). 
3 66 Stat. 209 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (d) ( 1952). 
4 The issue whether provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1952), were violated is not 
dealt with in this note. 
G Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). 
6 Id. at 314. 
71-7 U.S. (3 Dall.) 172 (1798). 
s Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416 (dissenting opin-
ion), appendix to dissenting opinion, 681 (1829); cf. I Crosskey, Politics 
and the Constitution, c. XI, 324 (1953). 
9 Accord. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); 
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannesen v. United 
States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 228 
(1883). 
10 See Stoddart v. Smith. 5 Binn. 355, 370 (Pa. 1812); Lessee of Joy 
v. Cossart. 1 Yeates 50, 54 (Pa. 1791); Helm's Lessee v. Howard, 2 H. & 
:c\!cH. 57, 85, 96 (l\Id. 1784). 
11 See Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 319 (Cir. Ct., Pa. 
Dist. 1795); IV Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions 
184-5 (2d ed. Iredell 1866); cf. I Crosskey, op. cit. supra note 8, at 
337, 341, 342. 
12 See II Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention 375, 435, 
440, 617, 640 (rev. ed. 1937). 
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v. Bull,13 went on to declare ex post facto every law that changes 
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law 
annexed to the crime when committed. 
It was later held, by a divided Court,14 that deportation is 
the result of civil proceedings, and not a punishmentY:> Thus, 
deportation laws are not subject to the limitations of the ex post 
facto clause.16 Later decisions have indicated that both the con-
struction of ex post facto and this definition of punishment are 
debatable,17 but have refused to overturn the earlier decisions be-
cause a great body of statutory and case law has been built on 
them.18 Justices Douglas and Black have dissented from this un-
yielding preservation of the status quo.19 
The Court has recognized that deportation may deprive a 
person of all that makes life worth living.20 Denials of the priv-
ilege of practicing law before the Supreme Court,21 or of being 
a priest,22 or a teacher23 have been defined as punishment; and 
such laws operating retroactively have been struck down as ex 
post facto.24 
While there is a great need for stability in the law, that fact 
should not be the sole criterion for determining constitutionality. 
It is submitted that the Court should have re-examined its early 
131-7 U.S. (3 Dall.) 172, 176 (1798). 
H Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 732, 744, 762 (1898) 
(dissenting opinions). 
15 Id. at 730. 
16 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594, 595 (1952); l\Iahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 
(1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913); Johannesen v. 
United States. 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912). 
11,see Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531, 532 (1954); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952). 
18 See cases cited note 1 7 supra. 
19 See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 319 (1955) (dissenting opinion); 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Harl-
siades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580. 598 (1952) (dissenting opinion). 
20 See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522. 530 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 522, 587 (1952); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 
388, 391 (1947); Bridges i.-. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147, 154 (1945); 
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
21 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). 
22cummings v. l\Iissouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). 
23 Cf. Wieman v. Updegraf, 344 U.S. 183, 185 (1952). 
24 But see Garner v. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 
U.S. 716 (1951); American Communications Ass'n, CIO v. Douds, 339 
U.S. 382 (1949); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
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decisions. If an earlier Court was ill-advised, their decision should 
be reversed. Such action is not unknown, though the holding be of 
long standing.25 
Deryl F. Hamann, '58 
!!G Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
